發(fā)布時間：2018-05-01 14:37

  本文選題：商標財產(chǎn)化 + 假冒之訴　； 參考：《西南政法大學(xué)》2014年博士論文

【摘要】：當前“商標財產(chǎn)化”一詞已為廣大學(xué)者采用，尤以批評者居多。有的學(xué)者認為，將商標作為一種財產(chǎn)，背離了商標法保護消費者之目的；有的學(xué)者認為，視商標為財產(chǎn)，將會割裂了商標與商品、服務(wù)之聯(lián)系，對消費者構(gòu)成欺詐；有的學(xué)者認為，商標財產(chǎn)化引起了商標權(quán)擴張，嚴重危害了社會公共利益。結(jié)合上述爭議，本文以“商標財產(chǎn)化”為研究對象，通過考察商標法律制度的起源，全面闡釋商標從“識別工具到私人財產(chǎn)”的發(fā)展歷程。 本文除了引言和結(jié)語外，尚有五章，凡十五萬言。在第一章，筆者對英國假冒之訴進行考察，探討財產(chǎn)語言在普通法商標案件中是如何生成的。假冒之訴的歷史可回溯至1584年的“JG訴山姆福特案”，四位主審法官之一的安德森認為：被告在商品上使用原告標記的行為構(gòu)成了對消費者的欺詐，應(yīng)當承擔(dān)普通法上的責(zé)任。雖然沒有史料記載安德森的意見是否被采納，后世法院紛紛引入“欺詐”作為判案基礎(chǔ)�！捌墼p”隨后逐漸淡出假冒之訴，原因在于普通法院與衡平法院的管轄權(quán)沖突。在普通法院審理的假冒案件中，商標所有人可以得到損害賠償，但無權(quán)申請禁令救濟，無法制止假冒行為。衡平法院雖然可以頒布禁令，卻無法管轄假冒案件，因為侵權(quán)人實施的是欺詐行為，而非侵害財產(chǎn)權(quán)。為了獲得假冒案件的管轄權(quán)，衡平法院將商標解釋為一種財產(chǎn)，這樣它就有權(quán)對假冒案件進行管轄。在1838年，韋斯特布里法官開啟了衡平法院以財產(chǎn)權(quán)為基礎(chǔ)審理假冒案件的先河。但對于商標財產(chǎn)本質(zhì)的認識，韋斯特布里法官也僅僅是模糊的提及了“侵害他人排他性的財產(chǎn)”，至于這是怎樣的財產(chǎn)？并未細說。他的見解也沒有獲得同行們的一致認同。到了20世紀初期，帕克法官將“商譽”概念引入假冒之訴，并區(qū)分了商譽與其他財產(chǎn)的區(qū)別，即商譽是商標所有人在商業(yè)活動中產(chǎn)生的，它的存在依靠他人的感知。對于假冒之訴而言，商譽的引進為其確立了獨立的保護對象，使其在商標成文立法日益昌盛的今日，仍保持了旺盛的生命力。而觀察古今普通法對假冒案件的判決，商標只是作為識別工具存在，其本身并無任何財產(chǎn)價值。 假冒之訴開啟了商標保護的先河，現(xiàn)代商標制度從中得到啟發(fā)，并確立其架構(gòu)。在第二章中，筆者分析現(xiàn)代商標法是如何加入知識產(chǎn)權(quán)法大家庭，又怎樣從假冒之訴中獨立出來，將商標作為財產(chǎn)進行保護。從知識產(chǎn)權(quán)的發(fā)展史可以得知，當專利法、著作權(quán)法紛紛制定之時，商標法仍處于“拖沓而雜亂不堪”，從未被考慮可以納入現(xiàn)代知識產(chǎn)權(quán)法的范疇之中。但在19世紀下半葉，由于諸多因素的推動，商標法成為了一個獨立的現(xiàn)代知識產(chǎn)權(quán)法法域。首要的原因便是社會環(huán)境的變化。工業(yè)革命的開展，為市場的崛起提供了動力。市場活動的日益繁榮，商標在商業(yè)實踐中得到越來越多的使用與價值認可。商人團體利用政治話語權(quán)向政府進行施壓，要求進行商標立法保護他們的商標財產(chǎn)。1860年，，英國謝菲爾德商會的議案，則代表了當時商人對政府保護商標財產(chǎn)的強烈訴求。他們要求政府建立商標注冊制度，并允許自由轉(zhuǎn)讓商標。這類型的呼吁為后來注冊制度的建立埋下了伏筆。其次，將商標法納入知識產(chǎn)權(quán)法最大的問題是，缺少理論的支撐。在19世紀，人們對財產(chǎn)的觀念停留在布萊克斯通的理論上，即財產(chǎn)是對“物”的絕對控制。而根據(jù)當其時假冒之訴案件的判決，商標并非是什么物，它只是一種識別工具。商標案件的判決基礎(chǔ)是“欺詐”，脫離了“欺詐”無任何侵權(quán)可言。后來，法院在司法實踐中逐漸對布萊克斯通的理論感到困惑。他們發(fā)現(xiàn)，財產(chǎn)并非僅限于“物”，許多非物質(zhì)的具有重大財產(chǎn)價值的利益也應(yīng)該受到保護。學(xué)者們也逐漸意識到，財產(chǎn)權(quán)并非是人與物的關(guān)系，而是人與人之間的關(guān)系。并且在當其時之“自由與財產(chǎn)福音”的洛克理論的影響下，認識到“使用創(chuàng)造財產(chǎn)”，而這種財產(chǎn)就是商譽。商譽在化解了商標作為“物”的尷尬之同時，也符合了知識產(chǎn)權(quán)法客體之無形性特征，為商標立法掃除了理論障礙。其三、注冊制度為商標財產(chǎn)保護之關(guān)鍵一環(huán)，如果商標獲得注冊，則自發(fā)出注冊證的那一刻起，它就當然成為該注冊證上列明者的財產(chǎn)了。不過，在使用取得商標權(quán)制度的國家中，注冊的意義僅僅是對在先權(quán)利的確認，而非授權(quán)。在注冊制度的保護下，商標也只是發(fā)揮著識別工具的作用，商標侵權(quán)仍是依消費者混淆之虞為判斷標準。直至后來，反淡化立法的出現(xiàn)，法院關(guān)注的焦點已不是消費者是否混淆，而是將重心放在商標本身的財產(chǎn)價值。 在商標財產(chǎn)化觀念的影響下，法院在實踐中不斷加大了對商標權(quán)人的保護。在第三章，筆者探討商標財產(chǎn)化的表現(xiàn)，闡明商標權(quán)人的利益如何在“財產(chǎn)”的庇護下得到加強。傳統(tǒng)的混淆之虞，向來是以消費者購買商品或服務(wù)之時為判斷基點。近年來，由于商標財產(chǎn)化的觀念不斷蔓延，特別是商標廣告功能被強化之后，美國等國家已經(jīng)將傳統(tǒng)上關(guān)于混淆之虞的判斷時間提前或挪后，不斷擴大了商標權(quán)的保護范圍。其次是商標的自由轉(zhuǎn)讓和許可。傳統(tǒng)上認為，商標與其商譽具有不可分離的關(guān)系。除非企業(yè)與商譽一起連同轉(zhuǎn)讓，否則商標轉(zhuǎn)讓無效。而現(xiàn)代將商標視為一種財產(chǎn)，自由處分就成為應(yīng)有之義。所以，TRIPS協(xié)定清晰地說明，無論是否連同所屬企業(yè)，商標均可以單獨轉(zhuǎn)讓。美國法院也放寬對轉(zhuǎn)讓的限制。聯(lián)邦最高法院馬丁法官說到，對商標單獨轉(zhuǎn)讓的有效性不能一概認為無效，只要受讓人制造的商品與讓與人先前生產(chǎn)的產(chǎn)品具有相同品質(zhì)且為相同種類。商標是否可以許可，之前在理論上也是存在障礙的。法院認為，商標只是識別工具。如果商標是由許可人擁有，但是商品確由被許可人提供，割裂了商標與商品之間的來源指示關(guān)系。法官后來意識到，商標不只是一種識別工具，還具有財產(chǎn)價值。只要被許可人的品質(zhì)能夠與許可人保持一致，不僅商標所有人能夠獲利，消費者利益也沒受到損害。最后是商標商品化。商標商品化的提出，引起眾多學(xué)者的反對。理由在于，商標只是識別的工具，傳統(tǒng)商標法的首要目的是保護消費者，而對商標商品化的保護，無疑是賦予了商標權(quán)人對商標擁有一個無限擴展的權(quán)利。盡管出現(xiàn)這種反對的聲音，美國國會和法院通過引入贊助或者關(guān)聯(lián)混淆，逐漸擴大了對商標商品化權(quán)的保護。 將商標視為財產(chǎn)，并不是沒有爭議的。晚近，商標財產(chǎn)化的話題牽扯到商標權(quán)的憲法基礎(chǔ)，以及商標權(quán)與人權(quán)、言論自由的關(guān)系等。在第四章，筆者首先對美國商標法的憲法命運進行描述，揭示出商標權(quán)雖然與著作權(quán)、專利權(quán)并列為知識產(chǎn)權(quán)。實際上，商標法的憲法基礎(chǔ)并不是依據(jù)“知識產(chǎn)權(quán)條款”，而是“貿(mào)易條款”。建立在此基礎(chǔ)上的商標法一方面要保護商標權(quán)人和消費者的利益，另一方面要從國家貿(mào)易政策出發(fā)維護市場的公平競爭。其次，通過分析2007年歐洲人權(quán)法院審理的“商標與人權(quán)第一案”，認為商標權(quán)在國際人權(quán)公約中沒有合適的地位，商標權(quán)本身不是人權(quán)，但可以依據(jù)《歐洲人權(quán)公約第一議定書》的“財產(chǎn)權(quán)條款”獲得人權(quán)公約的保護。最后，與其他財產(chǎn)不同，商標（特別是馳名商標）往往蘊含著特殊的社會屬性。一方面，商標具有文化價值，特定商標之形象成為消費者分享的語言。另一方面，商標屬于一種“商業(yè)言論”。法律在保護商標財產(chǎn)時，要防止權(quán)利人壟斷符號、壓制公眾言論空間。商標的社會屬性孕育了商標權(quán)與言論自由的內(nèi)在沖突，也決定了言論自由成為商標權(quán)的限制因素，其中商標戲仿和比較廣告是限制商標權(quán)的最典型情形。 在考察完商標財產(chǎn)化的起源、表現(xiàn)與爭議后，筆者在第五章對商標財產(chǎn)化進行反思。針對商標財產(chǎn)本質(zhì)的討論，筆者依照“信息說”的進路，認為商標只是信息的傳播媒介，標記本身不能被當做財產(chǎn)。相比之下，商標的財產(chǎn)本質(zhì)是商譽的觀點與信息說的理論較為吻合。但是，將商標財產(chǎn)本質(zhì)界定為商譽，并不是沒有問題的。商譽作為財產(chǎn)不僅面臨定義的問題，而且與傳統(tǒng)的有形財產(chǎn)或者知識產(chǎn)權(quán)相比，其具有存在時間非確定性、存在地域非確定性以及存在價值非確定性等特點。并且，商譽與商標常常是重疊、交織。商譽不等于商標，甚至意味著更多�？梢哉f，商標的財產(chǎn)價值離不開商譽，而商譽的財產(chǎn)價值卻不限于商標。針對商標立法目的之討論，筆者認為必須厘清一組概念：宗旨與目的。宗旨，是宏觀的、長遠的、相對靜態(tài)不變的。目的，是具體的、可以變化和調(diào)整的。默察商標法的發(fā)展史，維護“公平競爭”是商標法恒久不變的宗旨。保護“商標權(quán)”與“消費者利益”則是一體兩面之目的。針對商標侵權(quán)責(zé)任的探討，筆者認為賠禮道歉不應(yīng)適用于商標侵權(quán)糾紛。因為商標權(quán)不具有人身權(quán)的內(nèi)容。而且，從對象上看，商標權(quán)人一般為法人，法人在遭受商標權(quán)侵害時，其并無“精神損害”也無需“精神撫慰”。最后，從功效上看，在商標侵權(quán)案件中，賠禮道歉無法發(fā)揮引導(dǎo)侵權(quán)人真誠悔過的道德功能。鑒于賠禮道歉的局限性，筆者認為“消除影響”更契合商標侵權(quán)案件的需要。
[Abstract]:At present, the word "trademark property" has been used by many scholars, especially the critics. Some scholars believe that the trademark act as a kind of property deviates from the purpose of the trademark law to protect the consumer; some scholars believe that the trademark as property will split the trade mark and commodity, the connection of service and the fraud of the consumer; some scholars recognize that As a result, trademark property expansion has caused the expansion of trademark rights and seriously endangers the social and public interests. Based on the above dispute, this article takes "trademark property" as the research object. Through the investigation of the origin of the legal system of trademark, the article comprehensively explains the course of the development of trademark from "recognition tool to private property".
In addition to the introduction and conclusion, there are five chapters and one hundred and fifty thousand words. In the first chapter, the author investigates the counterfeit action in Britain and discusses how the property language is generated in the common law trademark cases. The history of the fake lawsuit can be traced back to the "JG v. Sam Ford case" in 1584, and Anderson, one of the four judge judges, thinks that the defendant is the defendant. The use of the label of the plaintiff on a commodity constitutes a fraud of the consumer and should be responsible for the common law. Although there is no historical record of the adoption of Anderson's opinion, the later courts have introduced "fraud" as the basis of the case. "Fraud" gradually fade out of the false prosecution, because of the ordinary court and the equitable court. The conflict of jurisdiction. In the counterfeit cases heard by the ordinary court, the owner of the trademark can get damages, but it is not entitled to apply for the injunction to prevent the counterfeiting. The equitable court, although it can enact the injunction, can not control the counterfeit cases, because the infringer carries out fraud, not infringing property rights. In order to obtain the counterfeit In the case of jurisdiction, the equitable court interpreted the trademark as a property so that it had the right to jurisdiction over the counterfeit cases. In 1838, judge West opened the precedent of the equity court to hear the counterfeit cases on the basis of property rights. But judge West was only a vague reference to the nature of the trademark property. In the early twentieth Century, judge Parke introduced the concept of "goodwill" to the counterfeit lawsuit and distinguished the distinction between goodwill and other property, that is, the goodwill is the product of the trademark owner in business activities. Its existence depends on the perception of others. For the counterfeit complaint, the introduction of goodwill has established an independent protection object and maintained its vigorous vitality in the day of the growing prosperity of the trademark legislation. What is the value of property?
The counterfeit lawsuit opens the precedent of trademark protection. The modern trademark system is inspired by the modern trademark system and establishes its structure. In the second chapter, the author analyzes how the modern trademark law is to join the large family of intellectual property law, and how to independent from the counterfeit lawsuit and protect the trademark as property. When the patent law and copyright law are set up in succession, the trademark law is still in a "procrastination and disorderly" and has never been considered into the category of modern intellectual property law. But in the second half of the nineteenth Century, because of many factors, the trademark law became an independent domain of modern intellectual property law. The first reason was the social environment. The development of the industrial revolution has provided the impetus for the rise of the market. The increasing prosperity of the market activities, the increasing use and recognition of the value of the trade mark in the business practice. The merchant groups use political discourse power to press the government to protect their trademark property for.1860, the British Sheffield merchants. The bill, which represents the strong appeal for the government to protect the trademark and property, requires the government to establish a trademark registration system and allow the free transfer of the trademark. This type of appeal has laid a burden on the establishment of the later registration system. Secondly, the biggest problem of the incorporation of Trademark Law into the knowledge rights law is the lack of theoretical support. In nineteenth Century, people's concept of property remained in the theory of Blackstone, that is, the property is the absolute control of the "thing". And according to the judgment of the case of counterfeiting, the trademark is not what the trademark is, it is only a kind of identification tool. The basis of the trademark case is "deceit", which is divorced from the "fraud" without any infringement. In the judicial practice, the court is gradually puzzled by the theory of blemstone. They find that property is not only "objects", and that many non material interests that have significant property values should also be protected. Under the influence of Rock's theory of "freedom and the gospel of property", the "use of the creation of property" is recognized, and this property is a goodwill. At the same time, goodwill also conforms to the intangible characteristics of the object of intellectual property law as well as the embarrassment of the trademark as "things", and has removed the theoretical obstacles for the trademark legislation. A key link of the protection of the standard property, if the trademark is registered, it is of course the property of the listed person from the moment the registration certificate is issued. However, in the country where the system of trademark rights is used, the significance of registration is only to recognize the prior right rather than to authorize it. Under the protection of the registration system, the trademark is also Only to play the role of identification tools, trademark infringement is still in accordance with the consumer confusion as the criterion of judgment. Until later, the emergence of anti dilution legislation, the focus of attention of the court is not whether the consumer is confused, but focus on the value of the property of the trademark itself.
Under the influence of the concept of trademark property, the court has continuously increased the protection of the trademark owner in practice. In the third chapter, the author discusses the manifestation of the trademark property and clarifies that the interests of the trademark owners are strengthened under the shelter of the "property". In recent years, because of the spread of the concept of trademark property, especially after the enhancement of the function of trademark advertising, the United States and other countries have expanded the scope of the protection of the trademark right in advance or after the time of the judgment of the risk of confusion. The second is the transfer and license of the trademark. There is an inseparable relationship. Unless the enterprise and the goodwill join together with the transfer, the transfer of the trademark is invalid. While the modern trademark is regarded as a property, the free disposal will be the proper meaning. Therefore, the TRIPS agreement clearly states whether the trade mark can be transferred individually or not. The United States Court also relaxes the restrictions on the transfer. The Federal Supreme Court, judge Martin, said that the validity of a separate trade mark can not be considered null and void. As long as the goods made by the assignee have the same quality and the same type previously produced by the transferor. Whether the trademark can be permitted or not, it is in theory a barrier before. The court believes that the trademark is only a tool for identification. If a trademark is owned by a licensor, but the commodity is provided by the licensee, it separates the relationship between the mark and the source. The judge later realized that the trademark is not only a tool of identification but also a property value. As long as the quality of the licensee can be consistent with the Licensor, not only the owner of the trademark can make a profit, but also the consumption of the trademark owner. The interests of the people have not been damaged. Finally, the commercialization of the trademark. The commercialization of the trademark has been raised by many scholars. The reason is that the trademark is only a tool for identification. The primary purpose of the traditional trademark law is to protect the consumer, and the protection of the commercialization of the trademark is undoubtedly endowed with the trademark owner with an unlimited expansion of the trademark. Despite this objection, the US Congress and the court gradually expanded the protection of trademark merchandising rights by introducing sponsorship or confusion.
It is not undisputed to see the trademark as property. In the fourth chapter, the author first describes the constitutional fate of the trademark law in the United States, and reveals that the trademark right, although with the copyright and the patent right, is listed as the knowledge production, and the trademark rights are related to the constitutional basis of the trademark right and the relationship between the trademark right and human rights and the freedom of speech. In fact, the constitutional basis of the trademark law is not based on "the terms of intellectual property" but "the terms of trade". On the one hand, the trademark law should protect the interests of the people of the trademark rights and the consumers, on the other hand, to maintain the fair competition of the market from the state trade policy. Secondly, through the analysis of the European human rights law in 2007, the European Law of human rights is analyzed. The "first case of trademark and human rights", which is heard by the hospital, holds that trademark rights do not have a proper position in international human rights conventions. Trademark right is not a human right in itself, but it can be protected by the human rights convention according to the "terms of property right" of the first protocol to the European Convention on human rights. Finally, unlike his property, the trademark (especially the well-known trademark) is often used. There is a special social attribute. On the one hand, the trademark has cultural value, the image of a specific trademark becomes the language of the consumer. On the other hand, the trademark belongs to a kind of "commercial speech". In the protection of the trademark property, the law should prevent the monopoly of the right holder and suppress the public discourse space. The social attribute of the trademark has bred the trademark right and the trademark. The internal conflict of freedom of speech also determines that freedom of speech becomes the limiting factor of trademark right, in which trademark parody and comparative advertising are the most typical cases of restricting the right to trademark.
After reviewing the origin, performance and controversy of the trademark property, the author rethinks the trademark property after the fifth chapter. According to the discussion of the nature of the trademark property, the author believes that the trademark is only the medium of information and that the mark itself can not be regarded as the property. Point is more consistent with the theory of information theory. However, it is not without a problem to define the nature of trademark property as goodwill. As a property, goodwill not only faces the problem of definition, but also has time uncertainty, regional uncertainty and value uncertainty in comparison with traditional tangible property or intellectual property. In addition, goodwill and trademark often overlap and interweave. Goodwill is not equal to trademark and even more. It can be said that the value of the property of a trademark is not free from goodwill, but the value of the property of a goodwill is not limited to the trademark. Far, relatively static. Aim, it is specific, can change and adjust. To observe the development history of trademark law and maintain "fair competition" is the tenet of the trademark law for a long time. Protection of "trademark right" and "consumer interests" is one of the two purposes. In the discussion of trademark infringement liability, I believe that the apology should not be made. It is applicable to trademark infringement disputes. Because the trademark right does not have the content of personal rights. Moreover, from the object of the object, the trademark owner is generally a legal person. When the legal person is infringed on the trademark right, there is no "mental damage" or "spiritual comfort". Finally, in the case of trademark infringement, in the trademark infringement case, the apology cannot give full play to the guide tortfeasor In view of the moral function of sincere repentance, in view of the limitations of apology, I believe that "eliminating influence" is more suitable for trademark infringement cases.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：D923.43

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