基于連鎖董事視角的稅收規(guī)避行為傳染效應(yīng)研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-08-04 17:31
【摘要】：已有企業(yè)避稅行為影響因素的研究,鮮有涉及對(duì)企業(yè)社會(huì)網(wǎng)絡(luò)屬性的探討。作為經(jīng)濟(jì)的重要組成部分,任何企業(yè)都不能獨(dú)立于其他企業(yè)單獨(dú)存在。連鎖董事的出現(xiàn),在企業(yè)間建立了緊密的關(guān)系網(wǎng)絡(luò),還為企業(yè)私有信息傳遞構(gòu)建了一條非公開渠道,從而促進(jìn)相似行為在企業(yè)間傳染。隨著中國企業(yè)現(xiàn)代董事會(huì)制度的建立,特別是獨(dú)立董事制度的引入,連鎖董事在中國上市公司中成為普遍現(xiàn)象。因此,從連鎖董事關(guān)系這一社會(huì)屬性視角研究企業(yè)避稅行為的傳染效應(yīng)具有重要意義。在構(gòu)建連鎖董事關(guān)系的基礎(chǔ)上,以2007年至2014年中國A股上市公司8 732條公司年度觀測(cè)值為樣本,將公司有效稅率、賬稅差異和固定效應(yīng)殘差法計(jì)算的賬稅差異作為避稅程度的測(cè)量指標(biāo),采用OLS回歸模型對(duì)避稅行為的傳染效應(yīng)進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。研究結(jié)果表明,通過連鎖董事傳遞的成熟避稅經(jīng)驗(yàn)可以降低目標(biāo)公司的避稅成本和管理者對(duì)避稅決策不利后果的擔(dān)憂,導(dǎo)致避稅行為在企業(yè)網(wǎng)絡(luò)間傳染。在控制內(nèi)生性問題和替代性解釋后,結(jié)論依然穩(wěn)健。進(jìn)一步研究發(fā)現(xiàn),避稅行為在同一地區(qū)的連鎖公司間更容易傳染,即傳染服從先內(nèi)后外律。最后,與CFO相比,當(dāng)連鎖董事為目標(biāo)公司CEO時(shí)更能促進(jìn)避稅行為傳染。以連鎖董事為視角的研究可以將企業(yè)的社會(huì)屬性納入到避稅行為影響因素的研究中,豐富避稅行為影響因素的研究視角。構(gòu)建了企業(yè)針對(duì)連鎖董事信息傳遞的成本收益決策框架,完善了連鎖董事傳染效應(yīng)的理論研究,對(duì)投資者和監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)有重要的實(shí)踐意義。
[Abstract]:There are few researches on the influencing factors of corporate tax avoidance behavior, and few on the attributes of corporate social network. As an important part of economy, no enterprise can exist independently from other enterprises. The emergence of chain directors has established a close relationship network among enterprises and a closed channel for the transmission of private information among enterprises, thus promoting the transmission of similar behaviors among enterprises. With the establishment of modern board of directors system in Chinese enterprises, especially the introduction of independent director system, chain directors have become a common phenomenon in Chinese listed companies. Therefore, it is of great significance to study the contagion effect of corporate tax avoidance from the perspective of chain director relationship. Based on the establishment of the interlocking directorship relationship, the effective tax rate of China's A-share listed companies, which is based on the annual observations of 8,732 companies listed in China from 2007 to 2014, is taken as a sample. The difference of account tax and the difference of accounting tax calculated by fixed effect residual method are used as the measure of the degree of tax avoidance. The OLS regression model is used to test the contagion effect of tax avoidance behavior. The results show that the mature tax avoidance experience transmitted by the chain directors can reduce the cost of tax avoidance of the target companies and the managers' worries about the adverse consequences of tax avoidance decisions, leading to the transmission of tax avoidance behavior among enterprises' networks. After controlling for endogenous problems and alternative interpretations, the conclusions remain robust. Further studies show that tax avoidance is more easily transmitted between chain companies in the same region, that is, contagion service from first to outer. Finally, compared with CFO, chain directors are more likely to promote the contagion of tax avoidance when the target company is CEO. The study from the perspective of chain directors can bring the social attributes of enterprises into the study of factors affecting tax avoidance behavior, and enrich the perspective of research on factors affecting tax avoidance behavior. This paper constructs a cost-benefit decision-making framework for information transmission of chain directors, and perfects the theoretical research on the contagion effect of chain directors, which is of great practical significance to investors and regulators.
【作者單位】： 西安交通大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;香港城市大學(xué)商學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金(71372163,71672141,71302195,71502139,71502134)~~
【分類號(hào)】：F275.4;F812.42
本文編號(hào)：2164597
[Abstract]:There are few researches on the influencing factors of corporate tax avoidance behavior, and few on the attributes of corporate social network. As an important part of economy, no enterprise can exist independently from other enterprises. The emergence of chain directors has established a close relationship network among enterprises and a closed channel for the transmission of private information among enterprises, thus promoting the transmission of similar behaviors among enterprises. With the establishment of modern board of directors system in Chinese enterprises, especially the introduction of independent director system, chain directors have become a common phenomenon in Chinese listed companies. Therefore, it is of great significance to study the contagion effect of corporate tax avoidance from the perspective of chain director relationship. Based on the establishment of the interlocking directorship relationship, the effective tax rate of China's A-share listed companies, which is based on the annual observations of 8,732 companies listed in China from 2007 to 2014, is taken as a sample. The difference of account tax and the difference of accounting tax calculated by fixed effect residual method are used as the measure of the degree of tax avoidance. The OLS regression model is used to test the contagion effect of tax avoidance behavior. The results show that the mature tax avoidance experience transmitted by the chain directors can reduce the cost of tax avoidance of the target companies and the managers' worries about the adverse consequences of tax avoidance decisions, leading to the transmission of tax avoidance behavior among enterprises' networks. After controlling for endogenous problems and alternative interpretations, the conclusions remain robust. Further studies show that tax avoidance is more easily transmitted between chain companies in the same region, that is, contagion service from first to outer. Finally, compared with CFO, chain directors are more likely to promote the contagion of tax avoidance when the target company is CEO. The study from the perspective of chain directors can bring the social attributes of enterprises into the study of factors affecting tax avoidance behavior, and enrich the perspective of research on factors affecting tax avoidance behavior. This paper constructs a cost-benefit decision-making framework for information transmission of chain directors, and perfects the theoretical research on the contagion effect of chain directors, which is of great practical significance to investors and regulators.
【作者單位】： 西安交通大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;香港城市大學(xué)商學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金(71372163,71672141,71302195,71502139,71502134)~~
【分類號(hào)】：F275.4;F812.42
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