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  本文關(guān)鍵詞：考慮搭便車行為的營銷渠道選擇策略研究　出處：《重慶交通大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 混合渠道 搭便車 Stackelberg博弈 演化博弈

【摘要】：隨著電子商務(wù)的飛速發(fā)展,網(wǎng)絡(luò)直銷渠道與傳統(tǒng)零售渠道并存的混合渠道模式已廣泛存在于實際應(yīng)用中�；旌锨�道結(jié)構(gòu)下,供應(yīng)鏈成員之間的搭便車行為不可避免,深刻影響著決策者的定價和渠道選擇策略。在此背景下,本文考慮基于零售商服務(wù)的搭便車行為,探討了制造商和零售商的渠道選擇問題。本文主要內(nèi)容如下:首先,綜合考慮消費者渠道偏好、零售商服務(wù)水平以及搭便車行為等因素,分別建立傳統(tǒng)單一零售模式、制造商雙渠道模式、零售商雙渠道模式和雙重混合渠道模式的需求模型。采用Stackelberg動態(tài)博弈模型對分散決策時的最優(yōu)定價進行求解。借助算例仿真,分析搭便車系數(shù)對定價和利潤的影響;分別從制造商和零售商視角,探討制造商優(yōu)先建立網(wǎng)絡(luò)渠道,以及零售商優(yōu)先建立網(wǎng)絡(luò)渠道這兩種情形下,供應(yīng)鏈成員均衡決策和收益的變化;研究分散決策時的渠道選擇策略,并探析供應(yīng)鏈成員中一方?jīng)Q策對另一方產(chǎn)生的影響。其次,從集中決策角度,分析制造商與零售商在上述四種供應(yīng)鏈模式的定價和收益,并與分散決策時的相應(yīng)收益進行對比;拓展基礎(chǔ)模型,在考慮搭便車行為的同時設(shè)計基于零售商需求數(shù)量的轉(zhuǎn)移支付合同,分析擬定轉(zhuǎn)移支付合同后供應(yīng)鏈成員的定價和收益。利用數(shù)值仿真,分析搭便車行為對協(xié)調(diào)定價、固定轉(zhuǎn)移支付及收益的影響,進一步探究供應(yīng)鏈得到協(xié)調(diào)之后的渠道選擇策略。最后,借助演化博弈論,將制造商與零售商視為有限理性的參與者,用博弈方群體代替博弈方個人,用博弈方策略類型比例代替?zhèn)鹘y(tǒng)博弈的混合策略,建立制造商和零售商采取不同策略時的復(fù)制動態(tài)方程,通過博弈方?jīng)Q策群體比例變化圖討論不同情況下兩個博弈方群體比例的復(fù)制動態(tài)關(guān)系,并歸納不同情形下供應(yīng)鏈模式的演化結(jié)果,從而分析長期發(fā)展中,供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)的均衡結(jié)構(gòu)。最后通過數(shù)值仿真,分析分散決策時搭便車系數(shù)和渠道偏好程度對渠道選擇策略的影響,以及轉(zhuǎn)移支付合同下的渠道選擇策略。通過以上研究發(fā)現(xiàn):一方面,分散決策時,搭便車系數(shù)和渠道偏好程度和對制造商與零售商策略演化路徑的影響不同,但對供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)演化結(jié)果的影響類似:經(jīng)過長期演化后雙方都選擇建立網(wǎng)絡(luò)直銷渠道;另一方面,轉(zhuǎn)移支付合同下的渠道選擇受到搭便車行為和固定轉(zhuǎn)移支付的綜合影響,制造商擬定轉(zhuǎn)移支付合同可以間接干預(yù)零售商的渠道選擇策略。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of electronic commerce, the mixed channel mode of network direct marketing channel and traditional retail channel has been widely used in the practical application, under the mixed channel structure. The free-rider behavior among supply chain members is inevitable, which has a profound impact on the pricing and channel selection strategy of decision makers. In this context, this paper considers the free-rider behavior based on retailer services. The main contents of this paper are as follows: firstly, considering the factors such as consumers' channel preference, retailers' service level and free-rider behavior. The traditional single retail mode and the manufacturer dual channel mode are established respectively. Stackelberg dynamic game model is used to solve the optimal pricing in decentralized decision-making. The influence of hitchhiking coefficient on pricing and profit is analyzed. From the perspective of manufacturer and retailer, this paper discusses the equilibrium decision and the change of profit of the member of supply chain under the condition of manufacturer giving priority to establishing network channel and retailer giving priority to establishing network channel. This paper studies the channel selection strategy in decentralized decision-making, and analyzes the influence of one decision on the other in the supply chain members. Secondly, from the perspective of centralized decision-making. This paper analyzes the pricing and profit of manufacturers and retailers in the above four supply chain models, and compares them with the corresponding returns in decentralized decision-making. This paper extends the basic model, designs the transfer payment contract based on the retailer demand quantity while considering the free-rider behavior, and analyzes the pricing and income of the supply chain members after the proposed transfer payment contract. This paper analyzes the influence of free-rider behavior on coordinated pricing, fixed transfer payment and income, and further explores the channel selection strategy after coordination of supply chain. Finally, with the help of evolutionary game theory. The manufacturer and retailer are regarded as the participants of limited rationality, the gambler group is used to replace the gambler individual, and the gambler strategy proportion is used to replace the traditional mixed game strategy. The replicative dynamic equations of manufacturers and retailers with different strategies are established, and the replicative dynamic relationship of the proportion of two gamblers is discussed by using the game party decision group proportion change graph. The results of the evolution of the supply chain model under different conditions are summarized, and the equilibrium structure of the supply chain system is analyzed in the long term. Finally, the numerical simulation is carried out. This paper analyzes the influence of free-rider coefficient and channel preference on channel selection strategy in decentralized decision-making, and the channel selection strategy under transfer payment contract. The hitchhiker coefficient, channel preference and its influence on the evolution of manufacturer and retailer strategy are different. However, the impact on the evolution of supply chain system is similar: after a long period of evolution, both sides choose to establish network direct marketing channels; On the other hand, the channel selection under the transfer payment contract is influenced by the free-rider behavior and the fixed transfer payment, so the manufacturer can indirectly interfere with the retailer's channel selection strategy by drawing up the transfer payment contract.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F274

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本文編號：1400802