發(fā)布時間：2018-12-16 06:54

【摘要】：貴州省農(nóng)業(yè)的基礎(chǔ)性地位突出，而脆弱的喀斯特生態(tài)環(huán)境導(dǎo)致自然災(zāi)害多發(fā)，嚴(yán)重阻礙農(nóng)業(yè)的正常生產(chǎn)，農(nóng)民較低的收入水平及及薄弱的風(fēng)險防范意識使得其抵御農(nóng)業(yè)生產(chǎn)風(fēng)險能力不足，不利于保障糧食生產(chǎn)安全及維護(hù)社會穩(wěn)定。由此，貴州的農(nóng)業(yè)生產(chǎn)迫切需要有效的風(fēng)險調(diào)控手段來保障其可持續(xù)發(fā)展。政策性農(nóng)業(yè)保險是一種政府提供保費(fèi)補(bǔ)貼以減輕農(nóng)民保費(fèi)支付負(fù)擔(dān)的農(nóng)業(yè)生產(chǎn)風(fēng)險調(diào)控工具，理論上有利于農(nóng)業(yè)資源的有效配置，促進(jìn)農(nóng)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)的增長。貴州省從2007年開始試點(diǎn)政策性農(nóng)業(yè)保險，在摸索的過程中取得一定成績，但仍然存在諸多問題。本文主要從農(nóng)戶政策性農(nóng)業(yè)保險需求行為影響因素和農(nóng)戶在政策性農(nóng)業(yè)保險開展中與其他主體的博弈行為兩方面入手，在準(zhǔn)公共產(chǎn)品理論、福利經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)理論和行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)理論基礎(chǔ)上，使用計量實(shí)證分析方法以及博弈模型研究方法對貴州省政策性農(nóng)業(yè)保險中的農(nóng)戶行為進(jìn)行分析和研究。針對農(nóng)戶政策性農(nóng)業(yè)保險有效需求不足的困境，本文利用貴州省金沙縣357戶農(nóng)戶調(diào)查數(shù)據(jù)，對農(nóng)業(yè)保險農(nóng)戶需求影響因素作直觀的描述性分析，并運(yùn)用Logistic分析法建立回歸模型，對影響農(nóng)民需求行為進(jìn)而導(dǎo)致農(nóng)民政策性農(nóng)業(yè)保險有效需求不足的主要原因進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析，得出結(jié)論：是否知道國家有補(bǔ)貼、遭受災(zāi)害的次數(shù)、主要從事的農(nóng)業(yè)生產(chǎn)活動和農(nóng)業(yè)保險對生產(chǎn)生活的重要性4個指標(biāo)是左右農(nóng)戶政策性農(nóng)業(yè)保險需求決策的決定性因素；對農(nóng)業(yè)保險的了解程度這個指標(biāo)則對政策性農(nóng)業(yè)保險的需求有一定的影響。通過構(gòu)造博弈模型發(fā)現(xiàn)只有實(shí)行政策性農(nóng)業(yè)保險，且保費(fèi)補(bǔ)貼的數(shù)量使得農(nóng)戶投保預(yù)期收益大于預(yù)期成本時，農(nóng)戶才會選擇購買政策性農(nóng)業(yè)保險。貴州省政策性農(nóng)業(yè)保險的保費(fèi)補(bǔ)貼水平并沒有達(dá)到廣泛鋪開承保分散風(fēng)險的預(yù)期目的，只有在政策性農(nóng)業(yè)保險保費(fèi)補(bǔ)貼與政府其他補(bǔ)貼款項(xiàng)相掛鉤的情況下，政府補(bǔ)貼水平提升到足夠使農(nóng)戶投保預(yù)期收益大于預(yù)期成本，廣大農(nóng)戶才積極地選擇購買政策性農(nóng)業(yè)保險。通過對貴州省政策性農(nóng)業(yè)保險中的農(nóng)戶行為進(jìn)行系統(tǒng)分析，，文章最后有針對性地提出了促進(jìn)貴州省政策性農(nóng)業(yè)保險開展的對策。
[Abstract]:The basic position of agriculture in Guizhou Province is prominent, and the fragile karst ecological environment leads to frequent natural disasters, which seriously hinders the normal production of agriculture. Farmers' low income level and weak awareness of risk prevention make their ability to resist the risks of agricultural production insufficient, which is not conducive to ensuring the safety of grain production and maintaining social stability. Therefore, Guizhou's agricultural production urgently needs effective means of risk control to ensure its sustainable development. Policy-oriented agricultural insurance is a kind of agricultural production risk control tool which is provided by the government to provide premium subsidy to reduce the burden of farmers' premium payment. It is beneficial to the effective allocation of agricultural resources and to the growth of agricultural economy theoretically. Guizhou Province has been experimenting with policy-oriented agricultural insurance since 2007, and has made some achievements in the process of exploration, but there are still many problems. This paper mainly starts with the influencing factors of farmers' demand behavior of policy-oriented agricultural insurance and the game behavior between farmers and other subjects in the development of policy-oriented agricultural insurance, and puts forward the theory of quasi-public products. Based on the theory of welfare economics and behavioral economics, this paper analyzes and studies the behavior of farmers in policy agricultural insurance in Guizhou province by using econometric empirical analysis and game model. In view of the dilemma of insufficient effective demand for agricultural insurance by farmers, this paper makes an intuitive descriptive analysis of the influencing factors of agricultural insurance farmers' demand by using the survey data of 357 households in Jinsha County, Guizhou Province, and establishes a regression model by using Logistic analysis method. This paper makes an empirical analysis on the main reasons that affect the behavior of farmers' demand and then leads to the insufficient effective demand for farmers' policy-oriented agricultural insurance, and draws a conclusion: do you know whether the state has subsidies and the number of disasters, The main agricultural production activities and the importance of agricultural insurance to production and life are the decisive factors of farmers' policy-oriented agricultural insurance demand decision-making. The degree of understanding of agricultural insurance has a certain impact on the demand of policy agricultural insurance. By constructing the game model, it is found that only when the policy agricultural insurance is carried out and the amount of premium subsidy makes the expected income of the insured farmers greater than the expected cost, the farmers will choose to purchase policy agricultural insurance. The insurance premium subsidy level of policy agricultural insurance in Guizhou Province has not achieved the expected purpose of widely spreading the coverage of dispersed risks, only if the premium subsidy of policy agricultural insurance is linked to other government subsidies, When the level of government subsidy is raised enough to ensure that the expected income of farmers' insurance is greater than the expected cost, the majority of farmers actively choose to purchase policy-oriented agricultural insurance. Based on the systematic analysis of the behavior of farmers in the policy agricultural insurance of Guizhou province, the paper puts forward the countermeasures to promote the policy agricultural insurance in Guizhou province.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：貴州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F842.66

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 黃正軍;;基于博弈理論視角下農(nóng)業(yè)保險政策性解讀[J];安徽農(nóng)業(yè)科學(xué);2010年28期

2 康松;李娟;;發(fā)展政策性農(nóng)業(yè)保險是現(xiàn)階段農(nóng)業(yè)保險發(fā)展之路[J];商業(yè)研究;2008年02期

3 楊新華;;農(nóng)業(yè)保險的利益主體聯(lián)動及其運(yùn)行機(jī)制[J];重慶社會科學(xué);2010年06期

4 張遵東;王鷺;;貴州省政策性農(nóng)業(yè)保險經(jīng)營模式探討[J];貴陽市委黨校學(xué)報;2013年03期

5 金大衛(wèi);潘勇輝;;政策性農(nóng)業(yè)保險的道德風(fēng)險調(diào)控初探——基于信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的視角[J];農(nóng)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)問題;2009年10期

6 劉開迪;;我國政策性農(nóng)業(yè)保險發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀及存在問題[J];中國農(nóng)業(yè)信息;2014年01期

7 賈云峗;;保險供給主體制約農(nóng)業(yè)保險發(fā)展問題的探討[J];生產(chǎn)力研究;2010年12期

8 孫訪竹;;發(fā)展我國政策性農(nóng)業(yè)保險的問題及對策微探[J];商場現(xiàn)代化;2010年18期

9 畢鵬;郄海蘭;李海倫;;我國政策性農(nóng)業(yè)保險問題研究[J];商場現(xiàn)代化;2013年03期

10 高子清;黃清;;政府與商業(yè)性保險公司種植業(yè)保險成本合作的博弈與績效分析[J];學(xué)術(shù)交流;2009年06期

本文編號：2381961