發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-05-22 07:30

  本文選題：擔(dān)保機(jī)構(gòu) + 融資性擔(dān)保��； 參考：《商業(yè)研究》2012年09期

【摘要】：在回顧相關(guān)擔(dān)保理論的基礎(chǔ)上,本文以融資擔(dān)保機(jī)構(gòu)的直接利益相關(guān)者(銀行和中小企業(yè))為研究視角,通過(guò)建模分析了融資擔(dān)保機(jī)構(gòu)與銀行之間的比例擔(dān)保,中小企業(yè)提供的反擔(dān)保,以及融資擔(dān)保機(jī)構(gòu)對(duì)中小企業(yè)調(diào)查監(jiān)控力度的強(qiáng)弱對(duì)其擔(dān)保風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響。研究結(jié)果表明:當(dāng)中小企業(yè)提供足夠的反擔(dān)保品并且該反擔(dān)保品價(jià)值大于擔(dān)保責(zé)任余額時(shí),加大對(duì)企業(yè)的調(diào)查力度以及增加擔(dān)保機(jī)構(gòu)的承保比例,有助于緩解信息不對(duì)稱帶來(lái)的逆向選擇和道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問(wèn)題;當(dāng)中小企業(yè)提供的反擔(dān)保品價(jià)值不足以抵償貸款金額本息和時(shí),加大對(duì)受保企業(yè)的調(diào)查力度以及提高承保比例只會(huì)加劇企業(yè)的逆向選擇和道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。
[Abstract]:On the basis of reviewing the relevant guarantee theory, this paper analyzes the proportional guarantee between the financing guarantee institution and the bank from the perspective of the direct stakeholders of the financing guarantee institution (banks and small and medium-sized enterprises). The counterguarantee provided by small and medium-sized enterprises and the influence of the intensity of supervision and investigation by financing guarantee institutions on the guarantee risk. The results show that when small and medium-sized enterprises provide enough countercollateral and the value of the countercollateral is greater than the balance of the guarantee liability, the investigation of the enterprise and the insurance coverage ratio of the guarantee organization should be increased. To help mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard problems caused by asymmetric information; when the value of countercollateral provided by small and medium-sized enterprises is not sufficient to meet the principal and interest of the loan amount, Increasing the investigation of the insured enterprises and increasing the coverage ratio will only aggravate the adverse selection and moral hazard of the enterprises.
【作者單位】： 陜西師范大學(xué)國(guó)際商學(xué)院;
【基金】：陜西師范大學(xué)人文社會(huì)科學(xué)研究基金項(xiàng)目《中小企業(yè)信用擔(dān)保機(jī)構(gòu)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)價(jià)與管理系統(tǒng)研究》,項(xiàng)目編號(hào):10SZD05
【分類號(hào)】：F832.4

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本文編號(hào)：1921091