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  本文選題：定向增發(fā)　切入點：利益輸送　出處：《湘潭大學》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：股權分置改革以來,越來越多的公司采用定向增發(fā)來募集資金。定向增發(fā)具有發(fā)行要求比較低、發(fā)行流程簡潔、可以自行承銷、募集資金額度比較自由,同時還能實現(xiàn)企業(yè)集團整體上市,減少關聯(lián)交易、同業(yè)競爭、關聯(lián)方擔保等不規(guī)范行為,引入戰(zhàn)略投資者以實現(xiàn)雙方資源共享等優(yōu)點。定向增發(fā)已經(jīng)成為了我國資本市場上進行再融資的主流方式。但是定性增發(fā)也是一把雙刃劍,在給公司再融資帶來便利的同時,也存在一系列的問題。由于我國上市公司的股權結構比較集中,大股東有機會通過支付較低的對價、注入不良資產(chǎn)等實現(xiàn)利益輸送,同時定向增發(fā)還會導致公司利益在不同股東之間進行分配,這樣給大股東侵占中小股東的權益提供了一條路徑。文章首先對國內外有關定向增發(fā)與利益輸送的相關研究進行了回顧,以信息不對稱理論、委托代理理論以及定向增發(fā)中的利益輸送行為為理論基礎,結合Z公司向大股東進行定向增發(fā)的案例,分析和研究了大股東在定向增發(fā)中存在的利益輸送行為。通過研究發(fā)現(xiàn)大股東在定向增發(fā)的過程當中主要是通過把握定向增發(fā)的時機把定向增發(fā)的定價控制在低位,在定向增發(fā)時獲得較高的價格折扣率、在定向增發(fā)的過程當中進行盈余管理以及定向增發(fā)后派發(fā)高額的現(xiàn)金股利等這幾種方式侵占中小股東的利益。同時在此基礎上從財務的角度分析了此次定向增發(fā)對公司的影響,發(fā)現(xiàn)公司通過這次定向增發(fā)并沒有改善公司財務狀況。經(jīng)過對大股東在定向增發(fā)中的利益輸送行為分析以及經(jīng)濟后果分析得出,大股東在此次定向增發(fā)過程當中通過多種手段進行利益輸送的結論。在文章的最后提出相關的建議和措施。首先是完善公司外部的相關機制,例如完善定價機制、加強對認購對象的監(jiān)管、加強信息披露等;然后加強公司內部治理,例如要優(yōu)化股權結構,引入戰(zhàn)略投資者、加強內部控制、完善獨立董事制度、加大對大股東的制衡等。
[Abstract]:Since the reform of split share structure, more and more companies have adopted additional issuance to raise funds. The issuance requirements are relatively low, the issuance process is simple, they can underwrite themselves, and the amount of funds raised is relatively free. At the same time, it can also realize the overall listing of enterprise groups, reduce related party transactions, interbank competition, related party guarantees, and other non-standard behaviors. The introduction of strategic investors in order to realize the sharing of resources between the two sides has become the mainstream way of refinancing in the capital market of China. But qualitative additional issuance is also a double-edged sword, which brings convenience to the refinancing of the company at the same time. There are also a series of problems. Because the equity structure of listed companies in China is relatively concentrated, major shareholders have the opportunity to realize the transmission of benefits by paying lower consideration, injecting non-performing assets, and so on. At the same time, it will also lead to the distribution of the company's benefits among different shareholders. This provides a way for large shareholders to encroach on the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders. Based on the principal-agent theory and the behavior of interest transmission in the directional additional offering, combining the case of Z company to the large shareholders, This paper analyzes and studies the behavior of large shareholders in the process of private placement, and finds out that in the process of private placement, the main reason is to control the pricing of private placement at a low level by grasping the opportunity of private placement. A higher discount rate of price is obtained at the time of the directional additional offering, In the process of private placement, earnings management and the distribution of high cash dividends after the placement of additional shares encroach on the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders. On the basis of this, this paper analyzes the impact of the private placement on the company from the financial point of view. It was found that the company did not improve the financial situation of the company through the IPO. Through the analysis of the behavior of the major shareholders in the transmission of benefits in the IPO and the analysis of the economic consequences, The conclusion that major shareholders carry out interest transmission through various means in the process of this private placement. At the end of the article, the relevant suggestions and measures are put forward. First of all, it is to perfect the relevant mechanisms outside the company, such as perfecting the pricing mechanism. Then we should strengthen the internal governance of the company, such as optimizing the ownership structure, introducing strategic investors, strengthening the internal control, perfecting the independent director system and increasing the checks and balances on the large shareholders.
【學位授予單位】：湘潭大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F832.51;F426.72

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