親歐盟示威危機(jī)后俄羅斯對(duì)外直接投資與國(guó)家附屬銀行的角色研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2025-06-25 23:13
為什么在2014年烏克蘭親歐盟示威危機(jī)后不久,在烏克蘭和俄羅斯陷入停滯的軍事沖突之后,俄羅斯對(duì)烏克蘭的外國(guó)直接投資(FDI)增加了?2015年至2017年,在兩國(guó)貿(mào)易周轉(zhuǎn)率下降、經(jīng)濟(jì)合作全面停滯的背景下,俄羅斯對(duì)外直接投資持續(xù)增長(zhǎng),其資金規(guī)模甚至超過2014年。烏克蘭和俄羅斯的專家和分析人士廣泛討論了這個(gè)問題,而許多烏克蘭人對(duì)親歐盟示威運(yùn)動(dòng)危機(jī)后俄羅斯企業(yè)仍在烏克蘭開展業(yè)務(wù)感到不快和失望。另一方面,最近俄羅斯面臨著投資外流,許多俄羅斯人也不理解為什么俄羅斯政府和企業(yè)要把錢投到國(guó)外。因此,本文的研究問題是:為什么在2014年烏克蘭親歐盟示威危機(jī)和俄烏關(guān)系大規(guī)模惡化之后的幾年里,俄羅斯對(duì)烏克蘭的直接投資反而大幅增長(zhǎng),甚至超過危機(jī)之前?本文研究發(fā)現(xiàn),俄羅斯在烏克蘭的直接投資中有超過60%流向了銀行業(yè),俄羅斯的國(guó)有銀行和國(guó)有關(guān)聯(lián)銀行接受了這些資金并將其投入到股本中。因此,盡管烏克蘭政府對(duì)這些銀行施加了制裁,造成經(jīng)濟(jì)損失,但這筆錢仍被用于對(duì)俄羅斯銀行的子公司的資本重組,使各公司能繼續(xù)在烏克蘭生存。通過對(duì)資金流的分析和全面研究以及對(duì)俄羅斯在烏克蘭直接投資性質(zhì)的考察,本文發(fā)現(xiàn),俄羅斯政府是利用經(jīng)濟(jì)手段...
【文章頁(yè)數(shù)】:74 頁(yè)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【文章目錄】:
中文摘要
abstract
CHAPTER1 Introduction
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Research question and hypothesis
1.3 Theory and methodology
1.4 Literature review
1.5 Importance of the study
CHAPTER2 History of Russian FDI in Ukraine before and after the Euromaidan crisis
2.1 The dynamics of Russian FDI in Ukraine
2.2 The distribution of Russian FDI within Ukrainian economy
2.3 Previous instances of Russia using economic statecraft in pursuit of geopolitical goals
CHAPTER3 Russian state-affiliated banks in Ukraine as an instrument of Russian foreign policy
3.1 The extent of Russian government control over the Russian banks operating in Ukraine
3.2 The commercial consequences of maintaining subsidiaries of Russian banks in Ukraine after the Euromaidan crisis
3.3 The political motives for the continued operation of the Russian banks’subsidiaries in Ukraine
CHAPTER4 Conclusion
BIBLIOGRAPHY
本文編號(hào):4052768
【文章頁(yè)數(shù)】:74 頁(yè)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【文章目錄】:
中文摘要
abstract
CHAPTER1 Introduction
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Research question and hypothesis
1.3 Theory and methodology
1.4 Literature review
1.5 Importance of the study
CHAPTER2 History of Russian FDI in Ukraine before and after the Euromaidan crisis
2.1 The dynamics of Russian FDI in Ukraine
2.2 The distribution of Russian FDI within Ukrainian economy
2.3 Previous instances of Russia using economic statecraft in pursuit of geopolitical goals
CHAPTER3 Russian state-affiliated banks in Ukraine as an instrument of Russian foreign policy
3.1 The extent of Russian government control over the Russian banks operating in Ukraine
3.2 The commercial consequences of maintaining subsidiaries of Russian banks in Ukraine after the Euromaidan crisis
3.3 The political motives for the continued operation of the Russian banks’subsidiaries in Ukraine
CHAPTER4 Conclusion
BIBLIOGRAPHY
本文編號(hào):4052768
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