發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-10-15 16:17

【摘要】：20世紀(jì)中葉的心理學(xué)研究降低了目擊證言證據(jù)的分量和強(qiáng)度,實(shí)驗(yàn)哲學(xué)家通過(guò)在受控制的環(huán)境系統(tǒng)中測(cè)試受訪者,同樣找到了質(zhì)疑直覺狀態(tài)作為可靠證據(jù)來(lái)源的理由,而一些傳統(tǒng)主義者卻否認(rèn)認(rèn)知科學(xué)能夠質(zhì)疑哲學(xué)直覺判斷的可靠性。我們不應(yīng)該急于對(duì)哲學(xué)直覺的錯(cuò)誤成分做出最終的判斷。一方面,在個(gè)人認(rèn)知的分類形成過(guò)程中,還有許多研究需要去實(shí)施;另一方面,根據(jù)孔多賽的"陪審團(tuán)定理",一旦我們意識(shí)到哲學(xué)需要利用群體共同發(fā)生的直覺,那么就可以大幅提高直覺方法在哲學(xué)上的證據(jù)價(jià)值。
[Abstract]:Psychological research in the middle of the 20th century reduced the weight and strength of eyewitness evidence, and experimental philosophers found reasons to question intuitive states as a reliable source of evidence by testing respondents in a controlled environmental system. Some traditionalists deny that cognitive science can question the reliability of philosophical intuitive judgment. We should not rush to make the final judgment on the wrong elements of philosophical intuition. On the one hand, there is still a lot of research to be done in the process of classifying personal cognition; on the other hand, according to Condoleezzi's jury Theorem, once we realize that philosophy needs to take advantage of collective intuition, The philosophical evidentiary value of intuitionistic methods can then be greatly enhanced.
【作者單位】： 羅格斯大學(xué)哲學(xué)系;
【分類號(hào)】：B842.1
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本文編號(hào)：2273083