發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-04-03 11:10

  本文選題：管理防御　切入點(diǎn)：會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性　出處：《中國(guó)礦業(yè)大學(xué)》2016年博士論文

【摘要】：現(xiàn)代企業(yè)兩權(quán)分離的治理特征突出了企業(yè)管理者在決策中的重要地位,但是在信息不對(duì)稱和契約不完備的情況下,自利的管理者與股東之間的目標(biāo)不一致,引發(fā)管理者固守職位并最大化自身效用的管理防御行為,進(jìn)而影響企業(yè)的會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性與權(quán)益資本成本。論文基于當(dāng)前中國(guó)上市公司大股東控制和內(nèi)部人控制雙重控制并存,企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性水平低和權(quán)益資本相對(duì)較高的現(xiàn)實(shí)背景下,研究管理防御、會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性與權(quán)益資本成本三者之間的關(guān)系。論文首先從經(jīng)濟(jì)人假說、委托代理理論、信息不對(duì)稱理論和控制權(quán)理論提煉管理防御理論的基礎(chǔ),在整體上為管理防御、會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性與權(quán)益資本成本研究奠定理論基礎(chǔ)。在此基礎(chǔ)上,從高階管理理論、行為一致性假說、不完全契約理論、信號(hào)傳遞理論、信息風(fēng)險(xiǎn)理論等相關(guān)理論,系統(tǒng)提煉出管理防御與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性理論基礎(chǔ)、會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性與權(quán)益資本成本理論基礎(chǔ)。最后,基于上述理論基礎(chǔ),提出了管理防御、會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性與權(quán)益資本成本關(guān)系的理論分析框架。論文利用多元線性回歸、主成分分析法、中介效應(yīng)檢驗(yàn)法和結(jié)構(gòu)方程等方法探討以下幾個(gè)方面的規(guī)律:管理防御程度的變量(包括管理者個(gè)人特征、管理者激勵(lì)特征、管理者所受約束特征)和上市公司會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性之間的關(guān)系規(guī)律、管理防御和上市公司權(quán)益資本成本的關(guān)系規(guī)律、會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性對(duì)權(quán)益資本成本影響規(guī)律、管理防御通過會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性影響權(quán)益資本成本的傳導(dǎo)規(guī)律。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):(1)管理防御影響會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性,管理防御程度越高,會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性越低。(2)管理防御影響權(quán)益資本成本,管理防御程度越高,權(quán)益資本成本越高。(3)會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性影響權(quán)益資本成本,會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性越高,權(quán)益資本成本越低。(4)在總體樣本中和國(guó)有樣本中,管理防御通過會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性影響權(quán)益資本成本的假設(shè)成立。論文的最后提出了取消國(guó)有企業(yè)高管的行政任命體制,關(guān)注管理者股權(quán)激勵(lì),完善職業(yè)經(jīng)理人市場(chǎng),健全管理者內(nèi)部約束機(jī)制等建議。論文立足中國(guó)特殊制度和背景,一定程度上拓展了管理防御理論,同時(shí)豐富了權(quán)益資本成本度量模型理論,拓展了權(quán)益資本成本研究的分析框架,為權(quán)益資本成本傳導(dǎo)相關(guān)問題研究提供了一種分析思路。為上市公司選拔高管、完善公司財(cái)務(wù)治理機(jī)制和降低公司融資成本提供了依據(jù)。
[Abstract]:The governance characteristics of the separation of two rights in modern enterprises highlight the important position of enterprise managers in decision-making, but in the case of asymmetric information and incomplete contracts, the objectives of self-interest managers and shareholders are not consistent.The management defense behavior, which causes managers to stick to their positions and maximize their own utility, thus affects the accounting conservatism and equity capital cost of enterprises.Based on the dual control of large shareholders and insiders of listed companies in China, the paper studies the defense of management under the background of low level of accounting conservatism and relatively high equity capital.The relationship between accounting conservatism and equity capital cost.Firstly, the thesis refines the foundation of management defense theory from economic man hypothesis, principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory and control rights theory, which lays a theoretical foundation for the research of management defense, accounting conservatism and equity capital cost.On this basis, from the high order management theory, behavior consistency hypothesis, incomplete contract theory, signal transmission theory, information risk theory and other related theories, systematically extract the management defense and accounting conservatism theory.The theoretical basis of accounting conservatism and equity capital cost.Finally, based on the above theoretical basis, the paper puts forward the theoretical analysis framework of the relationship between management defense, accounting conservatism and equity capital cost.In this paper, we use the methods of multiple linear regression, principal component analysis, intermediary effect test and structural equation to discuss the following aspects: the variables of the degree of management defense (including the personal characteristics of managers, the characteristics of managers' motivation, etc.)The relationship between accounting conservatism of listed companies, the relationship between management defense and the cost of equity capital of listed companies, the influence of accounting conservatism on the cost of equity capital,Management defense affects the conduction law of equity capital cost through accounting conservatism.The study found that: 1) Management defense affects accounting conservatism. The higher the degree of management defense, the lower accounting conservatism. 2) Management defense affects the cost of equity capital, and the degree of management defense is higher.The higher the cost of equity capital, the higher the cost of equity capital, and the higher the cost of accounting conservatism, the lower the cost of equity capital.The assumption that the defence of management affects the cost of equity capital through accounting conservatism is established.Finally, the paper puts forward some suggestions such as abolishing the administrative appointment system of senior executives in state-owned enterprises, paying attention to the incentive of managers' equity, perfecting the market of professional managers, and perfecting the internal restraint mechanism of managers.Based on China's special system and background, the thesis expands the theory of management defense to some extent, enriches the theory of measurement model of cost of equity capital, and expands the analytical framework of research on cost of equity capital.It provides an analytical idea for the research of the related problems of equity capital cost transmission.It provides the basis for the listed companies to select senior executives, perfect the financial governance mechanism and reduce the financing costs of the companies.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國(guó)礦業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號(hào)】：F275

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