發(fā)布時間：2018-04-24 05:15

  本文選題：產(chǎn)業(yè)政策 + 績效　； 參考：《山東大學》2016年博士論文

【摘要】：產(chǎn)業(yè)政策是市場經(jīng)濟國家在工業(yè)化進程中普遍采用的干預經(jīng)濟運行的手段,在各國經(jīng)濟發(fā)展初期,政府通過產(chǎn)業(yè)政策保護和扶植特定產(chǎn)業(yè),對推動國民經(jīng)濟快速發(fā)展發(fā)揮了重要作用。改革開放之后,中國政府相繼出臺了大量的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策文件,從產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的范圍來看,制造業(yè)是政府實施產(chǎn)業(yè)政策較多的領域,可以說,中國的工業(yè)化進程和制造業(yè)轉型升級都是在產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的引導下完成的。對于中國產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的有效性,學術界一直存在較大爭論,很多學者從中國產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的特征出發(fā)研究產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的實施效果,認為中國的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策延續(xù)了計劃經(jīng)濟時期政府直接干預經(jīng)濟的傳統(tǒng),阻礙市場競爭,產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展滯后；也有學者認為,政府制定的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策對經(jīng)濟轉型期產(chǎn)業(yè)結構調整和經(jīng)濟快速發(fā)展具有重要的推動作用。本文認為,要對產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的績效進行評價,需要區(qū)分不同類型的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策。根據(jù)1994年國務院頒布的《90年代國家產(chǎn)業(yè)政策綱要》中將產(chǎn)業(yè)政策劃分為產(chǎn)業(yè)結構政策、產(chǎn)業(yè)組織政策、產(chǎn)業(yè)技術政策和產(chǎn)業(yè)布局政策,以及拉爾(Lall,2003)關于選擇性產(chǎn)業(yè)政策和功能性產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的劃分。我們界定中國制造業(yè)轉型升級中產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的目標主要包括：結構調整、組織優(yōu)化、技術進步和就業(yè)穩(wěn)定四個方面,并運用理論和實證分析相結合的方法研究產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的有效性。最后基于實證分析的結論,指出了傳統(tǒng)選擇性產(chǎn)業(yè)政策存在的缺陷,以及實施功能性產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的政策建議。主要內容分別如下：第一,從理論和實證兩方面分析了產(chǎn)業(yè)政策在制造業(yè)結構調整中的實施效果。根據(jù)耗散結構理論,產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展的動因源自分工網(wǎng)絡內部的自發(fā)演進,產(chǎn)業(yè)結構變遷是在市場條件下自發(fā)實現(xiàn)的,產(chǎn)業(yè)政策發(fā)揮作用的基礎是市場機制正常運轉,產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的作用方向與產(chǎn)業(yè)自身發(fā)展規(guī)律相一致。中國傳統(tǒng)的“選擇性產(chǎn)業(yè)政策”傾向于挑選規(guī)模較大且國有資本比重較高的特定行業(yè)進行扶持,這種選擇性行為違背了市場規(guī)律,產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的效果往往并不理想。我們選取了2004—2014年中國工業(yè)34個細分行業(yè)的面板數(shù)據(jù)實證分析產(chǎn)業(yè)政策對產(chǎn)業(yè)結構調整的影響,把政府固定資產(chǎn)投資作為資本投入,政府研發(fā)資金投入作為技術投入,以要素投入傾斜來衡量產(chǎn)業(yè)政策偏向。結果發(fā)現(xiàn),固定資產(chǎn)投資傾斜與行業(yè)產(chǎn)出增長率之間存在負向關系,政府投資傾向于規(guī)模較大且國有資本比重較高的行業(yè),這些行業(yè)的產(chǎn)出增長率較低；固定資產(chǎn)投資傾斜對全要素生產(chǎn)率和技術改進有顯著的正向影響,對技術效率的影響不顯著,中國全要素生產(chǎn)率的提升主要得益于技術改進,技術改進則表現(xiàn)為對國外先進機器設備的引進,這主要是通過固定資產(chǎn)投資來完成的。研發(fā)資金傾斜對產(chǎn)出增長率和全要素生產(chǎn)率的影響都不顯著,表明中國政府研發(fā)支出的利用效率較低1。第二,對比分析中國鋼鐵行業(yè)和家電行業(yè)的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策特征及產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的績效。首先系統(tǒng)梳理了1994年以來的鋼鐵產(chǎn)業(yè)政策,分析產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的演變過程和特征,發(fā)現(xiàn)鋼鐵產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的最大特點是政府行政權力對經(jīng)濟的強勢干預。通過測算鋼鐵行業(yè)的市場集中度和生產(chǎn)效率來反映產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的實施效果,結果顯示：鋼鐵行業(yè)市場集中度偏低,2012年鋼鐵行業(yè)的集中度CR4和CR10分別只有27%和45.9%；鋼鐵企業(yè)空間分布比較離散,各地區(qū)重復建設嚴重；鋼鐵行業(yè)的生產(chǎn)效率呈下降趨勢,從2006年的0.617下降到2012年的0.586。中國鋼鐵產(chǎn)業(yè)政策失效的原因主要包括政策制定不合理和執(zhí)行不到位兩方面的缺陷：鋼鐵產(chǎn)業(yè)政策延續(xù)了計劃經(jīng)濟的傳統(tǒng),政府選擇代替市場競爭,不利于激勵企業(yè)提高生產(chǎn)效率；地方政府對企業(yè)的直接干預,扭曲了企業(yè)的投資行為,導致過度投資和產(chǎn)能過剩2。作為對比,我們以家電產(chǎn)業(yè)的發(fā)展歷程為起點,探討家電產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的特征及其對家電產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展的影響�？傮w來看,家電產(chǎn)業(yè)政策遵循了產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展的客觀規(guī)律,針對產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展的特點采取扶植和誘導的政策手段。選取了18家家電上市公司作為樣本實證分析家電企業(yè)的市場結構和技術進步：首先,采用新實證產(chǎn)業(yè)組織方法測算家電企業(yè)的市場勢力,結果顯示市場勢力溢價為0.842,說明家電企業(yè)不存在很強的市場勢力,屬于競爭型市場結構；其次,采用DEA-Malmquist方法測算了家電企業(yè)的全要素生產(chǎn)率,結果顯示,家電企業(yè)的全要素生產(chǎn)率不斷提高,這主要得益于技術改進,而技術效率和規(guī)模效率還不高。家電產(chǎn)業(yè)政策以優(yōu)先發(fā)揮市場機制的作用為前提,充分的市場競爭促使整個行業(yè)的技術水平不斷提升,寬松的外部環(huán)境和產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的有效引導共同推動家電產(chǎn)業(yè)快速發(fā)展。第三,基于行業(yè)和區(qū)域兩個層面實證分析了中國高技術產(chǎn)業(yè)的創(chuàng)新效率以及產(chǎn)業(yè)政策在促進技術創(chuàng)新方面的績效。借鑒余泳澤(2010)的研究,價值鏈視角下,高技術產(chǎn)業(yè)的創(chuàng)新過程可分為技術研發(fā)和成果轉化兩個階段,采用隨機前沿生產(chǎn)函數(shù)模型(SFA)研究中國高技術產(chǎn)業(yè)研發(fā)效率和轉化效率及產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的績效。行業(yè)層面：2000-2012年中國高技術產(chǎn)業(yè)16個細分行業(yè)兩階段創(chuàng)新效率水平總體偏低,2012年兩階段創(chuàng)新效率分別為0.41和0.25,相對而言,研發(fā)效率高于轉化效率；從動態(tài)趨勢看,兩階段創(chuàng)新效率都處于不斷提升過程,研發(fā)效率發(fā)展更快,2000-2012年研發(fā)效率的平均增長率達到8.36%,轉化效率年平均增長率只有0.3%1。區(qū)域層面：2000-2012年中國23個省份高技術產(chǎn)業(yè)的研發(fā)效率總體偏低,轉化效率相對較高,區(qū)域層面上兩階段創(chuàng)新效率與行業(yè)層面截然不同,說明大部分省份的高技術企業(yè)還不具備核心技術的研發(fā)能力,新產(chǎn)品銷售的利潤率較低,企業(yè)主要從事技術含量較低的加工組裝工作,依靠資源和勞動力的低成本優(yōu)勢來獲取微薄利潤；分區(qū)域來看,不同省份研發(fā)效率差距較小,但轉化效率差距較大,東部發(fā)達省份在成果轉化階段優(yōu)勢明顯,北京、天津、上海、江蘇、福建、山東、廣東等省份的高技術產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展較快2。我們用政府研發(fā)支出和知識產(chǎn)權保護來表示產(chǎn)業(yè)政策,實證分析產(chǎn)業(yè)政策和市場因素對兩階段創(chuàng)新效率的影響,結果發(fā)現(xiàn)：政府研發(fā)支出和知識產(chǎn)權保護對兩階段創(chuàng)新效率都有正向影響,但政府研發(fā)支出的貢獻度較小,知識產(chǎn)權保護對研發(fā)階段創(chuàng)新效率的正向影響更大；比較發(fā)現(xiàn),企業(yè)研發(fā)支出對技術創(chuàng)新的正向促進作用比政府研發(fā)支出的效果更大,市場競爭對兩階段創(chuàng)新效率的正向作用顯著。因此,市場機制下,企業(yè)應該成為研發(fā)活動的主體,政府構建企業(yè)研發(fā)創(chuàng)新的激勵機制,間接引導和鼓勵企業(yè)創(chuàng)新,而不是主導企業(yè)的研發(fā)活動。第四,基于財政支出的視角分析中國制造業(yè)轉型升級中產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的就業(yè)效應。中國經(jīng)濟步入新常態(tài),制造業(yè)轉型造成經(jīng)濟增速下滑,經(jīng)濟增長對就業(yè)的拉動作用趨弱,穩(wěn)定就業(yè)必將成為產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的重要內容。作為政府實施產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的重要工具,財政支出對就業(yè)具有重要影響,本文基于財政支出的增長效應和社會效應將財政支出分為經(jīng)濟建設支出、教育支出、技術支出和社會保障支出四類,理論分析不同類型財政支出對就業(yè)的影響機制。然后采用2007-2013年中國30個省份的面板數(shù)據(jù),實證檢驗財政支出規(guī)模和結構對就業(yè)的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：中國財政支出對就業(yè)的影響存在滯后效應,滯后一期財政支出規(guī)模對就業(yè)具有正向影響；不同類型財政支出的就業(yè)效應差別較大,其中,經(jīng)濟建設支出對就業(yè)的影響不顯著,技術支出只在當期對就業(yè)有正向影響,而教育和社會保障支出對就業(yè)的長期正向影響顯著。因此,政府可以通過調整財政支出規(guī)模和結構來實現(xiàn)“穩(wěn)就業(yè)、調結構”的目標,提高政府在教育、技術和社會保障方面的財政支出比重,改善教育支出結構、技術創(chuàng)新激勵機制和社會保障繳費體制1。第五,在實證分析產(chǎn)業(yè)政策績效的基礎上,本文指出了選擇性產(chǎn)業(yè)政策存在的缺陷,以及功能性產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的轉型方向。選擇性產(chǎn)業(yè)政策體現(xiàn)出政府直接干預微觀經(jīng)濟、政府選擇代替市場競爭的特征。隨著市場經(jīng)濟體制不斷完善,其阻礙競爭、創(chuàng)新激勵不足和維系行政壟斷等弊端逐步顯現(xiàn)出來,制約了產(chǎn)業(yè)結構調整和經(jīng)濟長期增長。因此,適應于市場經(jīng)濟發(fā)展和制造業(yè)轉型的需要,產(chǎn)業(yè)政策應該由選擇性產(chǎn)業(yè)政策向功能性產(chǎn)業(yè)政策轉型,形成競爭政策優(yōu)先、產(chǎn)業(yè)政策與競爭政策協(xié)調互補的公共政策體系。產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的作用范圍應局限在市場失靈和社會服務領域,政策手段由直接干預向市場監(jiān)管和間接引導轉變2。
[Abstract]:Industrial policy is a means for the market economy countries to intervene in the economic operation generally in the process of industrialization. In the early stages of economic development of various countries, the government has played an important role in promoting the rapid development of the national economy through industrial policy protection and support of specific industries. After the reform and opening up, a large number of industrial policies have been issued by the Chinese government. According to the scope of industrial policy, the manufacturing industry is the field that the government implements more industrial policies. It can be said that the process of industrialization and the transformation and upgrading of the manufacturing industry are all completed under the guidance of industrial policy. There has been a great debate on the effectiveness of China's industrial policy, and many scholars have from China's industrial policy. This paper studies the effect of the implementation of the industrial policy, and holds that China's industrial policy continues the government's direct intervention in the economy during the planned economy, hinders the market competition and the industrial development lags behind, and some scholars believe that the industrial policy formulated by the government has an important impetus to the restructuring and rapid economic development of the industrial transition period. In order to evaluate the performance of industrial policy, it is necessary to distinguish different types of industrial policies. According to the national industrial policy outline of the <90 years promulgated by the State Council in 1994, industrial policy is divided into industrial structure policy, industrial organization policy, industrial technology policy and industrial layout policy, and raler (Lall, 2003). The division of selective industrial policy and functional industrial policy. We define the target of industrial policy in the transformation and upgrading of China's manufacturing industry, which include four aspects: structural adjustment, organizational optimization, technological progress and employment stability, and the effectiveness of industrial policy by combining theory with empirical analysis. Finally, it is based on empirical analysis. It points out the shortcomings of the traditional selective industrial policy and the policy suggestions for the implementation of the functional industrial policy. The main contents are as follows: first, the implementation effect of industrial policy in the structural adjustment of manufacturing industry is analyzed from two aspects of theory and demonstration. The motivation of industrial development is derived from the division of labor according to the theory of dissipative structure. The spontaneous evolution of the network within the network, the industrial structure changes are realized spontaneously under the market conditions. The basis of the role of industrial policy is the normal operation of the market mechanism. The direction of the role of industrial policy is consistent with the law of the industry itself. The traditional "selective industrial policy" in China is inclined to select a larger scale and the proportion of the state-owned capital. Higher specific industry support, this selective behavior is contrary to the law of the market, the effect of industrial policy is often not ideal. We selected the panel data of the 34 segments of China's industry from 2004 to 2014 to analyze the impact of industrial policy on industrial structure adjustment, and the government fixed assets investment as capital input, the government As a technical input, R & D investment is used as a technical input to measure the bias of industrial policy. The result shows that there is a negative relationship between the investment inclination of fixed assets and the growth rate of industry output, and the government investment tends to be larger and the proportion of the state-owned capital is higher, and the output growth rate of these industries is low; the investment in fixed assets is relatively low. There is a significant positive impact on total factor productivity and technological improvement, and the impact on technical efficiency is not significant. The promotion of total factor productivity in China is mainly due to technical improvement, and the improvement of technology is the introduction of advanced machinery and equipment abroad. This is mainly done through investment in fixed assets. The effect of growth rate and total factor productivity is not significant, which indicates that the utilization efficiency of R & D expenditure of the Chinese government is 1. second. It compares and analyses the characteristics of industrial policy and the performance of industrial policy in China's iron and steel industry and household electrical appliance industry. The biggest characteristic of the steel industry policy is the strong intervention of the government administrative power to the economy. By measuring the market concentration and production efficiency of the iron and steel industry, it reflects the effect of the implementation of the industrial policy. The results show that the market concentration of the steel industry is low, and the concentration of the iron and steel industry in 2012 is only 27% and 45.9%, respectively, CR4 and CR10; The spatial distribution of iron and steel enterprises is relatively discrete and the repeated construction in each region is serious. The production efficiency of the iron and steel industry is declining. The reasons for the failure of the 0.586. China's steel industry policy from 0.617 in 2006 to 2012 mainly include the unreasonable policy making and the defective implementation of the two side of the iron and steel industry: the steel industry policy continues the plan. In the traditional economy, the government chooses to replace the market competition, which is not conducive to encouraging the enterprise to improve the production efficiency; the direct intervention of the local government to the enterprise distorts the investment behavior of the enterprise, and results in the excess investment and overcapacity 2. as a contrast. We take the development course of the household electrical appliance industry as the starting point, and discuss the characteristics of the household appliance industry policy and the household appliance. In general, the household electrical appliance industry policy follows the objective law of the industrial development, and adopts the policy means to support and induce the industrial development. 18 electric listed companies are selected as samples to analyze the market structure and technical step of the household electrical appliance enterprises. First, the new empirical industrial organization method is used to measure the industrial development. The market power of household electrical appliance enterprises shows that the premium of market power is 0.842, indicating that there is no strong market power in the household electrical appliance enterprises, which belongs to the competitive market structure. Secondly, the total factor productivity of household electrical appliance enterprises is calculated by DEA-Malmquist method. The result shows that the total factor productivity of household electrical appliance enterprises is increasing, which is mainly benefited. The technical efficiency and the scale efficiency are not high. The household appliance industry policy is the premise of giving priority to the market mechanism. The full market competition promotes the technological level of the whole industry. The loose external environment and the effective guidance of industrial policies promote the rapid development of the household electrical appliances industry. Third, based on the industry and the industry, The innovation efficiency of China's high-tech industry and the performance of industrial policy in promoting technological innovation are analyzed in two aspects. From the study of Yu Yongze (2010), from the perspective of value chain, the innovation process of high technology industry can be divided into two stages of technology R & D and transformation of results, and the study of the stochastic frontier production function model (SFA) The efficiency of R & D and conversion efficiency and the performance of industrial policy in China's high-tech industry. Industry level: the level of innovation efficiency in the two stages of the 16 segments of China's high technology industry in the 2000-2012 years is generally low, and the efficiency of innovation in the two stage of 2012 is 0.41 and 0.25 respectively. Relatively speaking, the efficiency of R & D is higher than the conversion efficiency; from the dynamic trend, two The efficiency of the stage innovation is in the process of continuous promotion, the efficiency of R & D development is faster, the average growth rate of R & D efficiency in 2000-2012 years reaches 8.36%, the average annual growth rate of conversion efficiency is only 0.3%1. regional level: the efficiency of R & D in the 23 provinces of China in 2000-2012 years is generally low, the conversion efficiency is relatively high, and the regional level is two. The efficiency of the stage innovation is completely different from the industry level, indicating that the high-tech enterprises in most provinces do not have the research and development ability of the core technology, the profit rate of the new product sales is low, the enterprises mainly engage in the processing and assembly with low technical content, and rely on the low cost advantage of the resources and labor to obtain the small profit. The efficiency gap of R & D in different provinces is small, but the gap of conversion efficiency is large. The advantages of the eastern developed provinces are obvious in the stage of transformation of achievements. The high-tech industries in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong and other provinces are developing faster. We use government R & D expenditure and intellectual property protection to express industrial policy, and analyze the industrial policies with empirical analysis. The effects of policy and market factors on the efficiency of the two stage of innovation are found: the Government R & D expenditure and intellectual property protection have a positive impact on the efficiency of the two stage of innovation, but the contribution degree of the Government R & D expenditure is smaller and the intellectual property rights protection has a greater positive impact on the innovation efficiency in the R & D stage; and the comparison found that the enterprise R & D expenditure is on the technology. The positive effect of innovation is more effective than the Government R & D expenditure. Market competition has a positive effect on the efficiency of the two stage of innovation. Therefore, under the market mechanism, the enterprise should be the main body of R & D activities, the government constructs the incentive mechanism of enterprise R & D innovation, indirectly guides and encourages enterprise innovation, but not the leading enterprise's R & D activity. Fourth, based on the perspective of financial expenditure, this paper analyzes the employment effect of industrial policy in the transformation and upgrading of China's manufacturing industry. China's economy has entered a new normal state, the transformation of manufacturing industry has caused economic growth to decline, economic growth has weakened the pull effect on employment, and stable employment will become an important content of the policy of industry. Important tools, financial expenditure has an important impact on employment. Based on the growth effect and social effect of fiscal expenditure, this paper divides the fiscal expenditure into four categories: economic construction expenditure, educational expenditure, technical expenditure and social security expenditure, and analyzes the influence mechanism of different types of fiscal expenditure on employment. Then it adopts 30 provinces in China for 2007-2013 years. The study shows that there is a lag effect on the impact of Chinese fiscal expenditure on employment, and the scale of fiscal expenditure has a positive impact on employment; the employment effect of different types of fiscal expenditure is quite different, among which, the shadow of economic construction expenditure on Employment The government can achieve the goal of "stabilizing employment, adjusting the structure" by adjusting the scale and structure of financial expenditure, so as to improve the government's financial expenditure ratio in education, technology and social security. To improve the structure of educational expenditure, the incentive mechanism of technological innovation and the social security payment system 1. fifth. On the basis of the empirical analysis of the performance of industrial policy, this paper points out the shortcomings of the selective industrial policy and the transformation direction of the functional industrial policy. The selective industrial policy embodies the government's direct intervention in the micro economy, the government is directly interfering with the micro economy. Choosing to replace the characteristics of market competition, with the continuous improvement of the market economy system, the drawbacks of its hindrance to competition, the lack of innovation incentive and the maintenance of administrative monopoly have gradually emerged, which restrict the adjustment of industrial structure and the long-term economic growth. Therefore, the industrial policy should be selected from the needs of the market economy and the transformation of the manufacturing industry. The policy of industry policy should be limited in the field of market failure and social service, and the policy means should be changed from direct intervention to market supervision and inter connection guidance by 2..

【學位授予單位】：山東大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F424
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本文編號：1795304