發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-04-24 03:16

  本文選題：貿(mào)易洗錢 + 進(jìn)化博弈��； 參考：《西南交通大學(xué)》2010年碩士論文

【摘要】： 隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化和信息化的深入發(fā)展,世界各國的聯(lián)系日益緊密,跨國洗錢是洗錢犯罪的一種主要形式,而貿(mào)易則是跨國洗錢最有效的載體。FATF于2006年公布的《貿(mào)易洗錢》類型研究報(bào)告詳細(xì)地描述了貿(mào)易洗錢的各種手法。此后,貿(mào)易洗錢正式進(jìn)入了國際反洗錢組織監(jiān)管的視野,然而由于種種原因各國對(duì)貿(mào)易洗錢的監(jiān)管收效甚微。《2008中國反洗錢報(bào)告》對(duì)于貿(mào)易洗錢的案例也只是寥寥數(shù)語。鑒于貿(mào)易洗錢具有跨國性、復(fù)雜性和極大的隱蔽性等特點(diǎn),各國必須建立長期有效的合作機(jī)制才能遏制貿(mào)易洗錢犯罪,同時(shí),在國家內(nèi)部處于反貿(mào)易洗錢第一線的相關(guān)部門(如：海關(guān)、銀行等)也必須加強(qiáng)合作共同打擊貿(mào)易洗錢犯罪。 基于此,建立有效的合作機(jī)制打擊貿(mào)易洗錢犯罪迫在眉睫,但由于各國之間存在著諸如：法律、政策、經(jīng)濟(jì)、地理?xiàng)l件等方面的差異,在一定程度上會(huì)影響合作的效果,因此,合作并不是一帆風(fēng)順的。本文正是基于上述背景,針對(duì)國家內(nèi)部如：海關(guān)、銀行等不同部門的合作進(jìn)行分析以及國與國之間相應(yīng)的貿(mào)易監(jiān)管部門是否能夠建立起長期有效的合作機(jī)制進(jìn)行了較為深入的研究。 本文主要做了以下工作： (1)通過對(duì)FATF類型報(bào)告洗錢犯罪案例進(jìn)行歸類總結(jié),將貿(mào)易洗錢組織分成了三類：臨時(shí)性貿(mào)易洗錢組織；長期性貿(mào)易洗錢組織和混合型貿(mào)易洗錢組織。通過對(duì)這三種類型的洗錢組織分析,可以使貿(mào)易監(jiān)管部門根據(jù)其特點(diǎn)采取有效的打擊措施。 (2)本文運(yùn)用進(jìn)化博弈理論對(duì)貿(mào)易監(jiān)管方和貿(mào)易洗錢者的決策行為進(jìn)行分析。假設(shè)雙方都是有限理性經(jīng)濟(jì)人,并且他們?cè)谛袆?dòng)時(shí)不可能一次性達(dá)到均衡狀態(tài)。另外,本文主要研究博弈雙方行為選擇的互動(dòng)過程以及雙方達(dá)到的均衡狀態(tài)是否具有抗干擾能力。 (3)利用進(jìn)化博弈論對(duì)各國監(jiān)管部門的合作行為進(jìn)行分析,試圖找出其合作基礎(chǔ),分析合作有沒有長期穩(wěn)定性的可能,并且針對(duì)分析的結(jié)果給出相應(yīng)的策略用以維持長期有效的合作。 本文最主要的貢獻(xiàn)在于,利用進(jìn)化博弈論對(duì)各國相應(yīng)部門的合作機(jī)制運(yùn)行機(jī)理進(jìn)行了較為深入的分析,并提出了維持合作機(jī)制有效運(yùn)行的建議。
[Abstract]:With the deepening development of economic globalization and information technology, countries in the world are increasingly closely linked. Transnational money laundering is a major form of money laundering crime. Trade is the most effective carrier of transnational money laundering. Since then, trade money laundering has formally entered the perspective of international anti-money laundering organization supervision, but for various reasons, the supervision of trade money laundering has little effect. < 2008 China Anti-Money-Laundering report > is only a few words for the case of trade money laundering. In view of the transnational nature, complexity and great concealment of trade money-laundering, countries must establish long-term and effective cooperation mechanisms to curb the crime of trade money-laundering, and at the same time, Relevant departments (such as customs, banks, etc.) that are at the forefront of anti-trade money-laundering within the country must also strengthen cooperation to combat trade money-laundering. Based on this, it is urgent to establish an effective cooperation mechanism to combat the crime of trade money-laundering. However, due to the differences between countries in such aspects as law, policy, economy, geography and so on, the effect of cooperation will be affected to a certain extent. Cooperation is not smooth sailing. Based on the above background, this paper aims at the internal customs, This paper analyzes the cooperation of different departments such as banks and studies whether the corresponding trade regulatory departments can establish a long-term and effective cooperation mechanism between countries. The main work of this paper is as follows: 1) by classifying and summarizing the cases of money laundering crimes reported by FATF, the trade money laundering organizations are divided into three categories: temporary trade money laundering organizations, long-term trade money laundering organizations and mixed trade money laundering organizations. Through the analysis of these three types of money laundering organizations, the trade supervision department can take effective measures according to its characteristics. In this paper, evolutionary game theory is used to analyze the decision-making behaviors of trade regulators and trade launderers. Assume that both parties are bounded rational agents, and they can not act in a one-off equilibrium state. In addition, this paper mainly studies the interactive process of behavior choice and whether the equilibrium state reached by both sides has anti-interference ability. Using evolutionary game theory to analyze the cooperative behavior of regulatory authorities in various countries, trying to find out the basis of cooperation, and to analyze whether the cooperation can be stable in the long run. According to the results of the analysis, the corresponding strategies are given to maintain long-term and effective cooperation. The main contribution of this paper is to make a deep analysis of the mechanism of cooperative mechanism in different countries by using evolutionary game theory, and put forward some suggestions to maintain the effective operation of cooperative mechanism.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類號(hào)】：D996;D917

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