發(fā)布時間：2018-08-05 10:58

【摘要】：費(fèi)用（成本）管理是企業(yè)管理的重要內(nèi)容，對費(fèi)用（成本）習(xí)性（cost behavior）的研究有助于企業(yè)內(nèi)部經(jīng)理人進(jìn)行成本費(fèi)用決策、外部投資者及相關(guān)機(jī)構(gòu)進(jìn)行企業(yè)績效預(yù)測。費(fèi)用粘性（cost stickiness）作為費(fèi)用習(xí)性的一種表現(xiàn)，其研究根源在于對經(jīng)理人以傳統(tǒng)成本習(xí)性模型為基礎(chǔ)所作決策是否足夠準(zhǔn)確的考慮。本文研究的出發(fā)點(diǎn)正是基于經(jīng)理人對費(fèi)用粘性的影響，如何激勵經(jīng)理人更多地進(jìn)行積極的成本管理，，制約其消極的成本決策。 經(jīng)理人的費(fèi)用決策關(guān)乎企業(yè)的成敗興衰，然而，經(jīng)理人的動機(jī)才是其費(fèi)用決策背后的真正推動力，經(jīng)理人的不同動機(jī)與費(fèi)用習(xí)性之間有著必然的聯(lián)系，而公司治理設(shè)計(jì)的初衷正是想實(shí)現(xiàn)股東對經(jīng)理人的監(jiān)督與制衡。因此，本文針對公司治理、經(jīng)理人動機(jī)與費(fèi)用粘性的關(guān)系進(jìn)行研究，厘清了不同經(jīng)理人動機(jī)對費(fèi)用習(xí)性的影響路徑，為企業(yè)通過費(fèi)用比率進(jìn)行經(jīng)理人績效考核提供了更為全面的理論指導(dǎo)，對如何加強(qiáng)公司治理以制約經(jīng)理人自利動機(jī)從而減輕代理問題，如何加強(qiáng)費(fèi)用控制以提高公司價值具有現(xiàn)實(shí)指導(dǎo)意義。 在對本研究涉及的理論基礎(chǔ)和國內(nèi)外關(guān)于費(fèi)用粘性特征、成因、影響因素及其經(jīng)濟(jì)后果的文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行回顧和述評的基礎(chǔ)上，本文從對費(fèi)用粘性產(chǎn)生的成因和影響因素進(jìn)行理論分析入手，首先研究了經(jīng)理人最優(yōu)決策動機(jī)、盈余管理動機(jī)、自利動機(jī)三種不同動機(jī)對費(fèi)用粘性的影響，研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，經(jīng)理人最優(yōu)決策動機(jī)會導(dǎo)致較高水平的費(fèi)用粘性；具有保盈動機(jī)的樣本公司，費(fèi)用的對稱性表現(xiàn)得更明顯；而具有新股發(fā)行動機(jī)的公司，費(fèi)用表現(xiàn)出反粘性的特征；經(jīng)理人自利動機(jī)對費(fèi)用粘性水平有積極的影響，具體而言，并購重組事件是經(jīng)理人自利動機(jī)付諸實(shí)施的前提條件，充足的自由現(xiàn)金流和較長的經(jīng)理人任期是經(jīng)理人自利動機(jī)實(shí)施的必備條件，而經(jīng)理人薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)中變動性比例的增加會刺激經(jīng)理人自利動機(jī)的實(shí)施，這些因素均對費(fèi)用粘性產(chǎn)生顯著的正向影響。其次本文考察了公司治理對經(jīng)理人自利動機(jī)的制約作用，研究表明，較高的公司治理強(qiáng)度有利于抑制經(jīng)理人的自利動機(jī)，從而降低經(jīng)理人自利動機(jī)下形成的費(fèi)用粘性，提高公司價值；而公司治理水平低的公司，經(jīng)理人自利動機(jī)比較明顯，費(fèi)用粘性也相對較高。進(jìn)一步，經(jīng)理人在最優(yōu)決策動機(jī)下形成的費(fèi)用粘性將對公司價值的增長傳遞積極的信號；而在自利動機(jī)下形成的費(fèi)用粘性，表明費(fèi)用管理的低效率，將對公司價值的增長傳遞消極的信號。最后是本文的研究結(jié)論，并為我國企業(yè)經(jīng)理人能科學(xué)合理進(jìn)行成本管理決策給出了政策建議。
[Abstract]:Cost (cost) management is an important part of enterprise management. The study of (cost behavior) habit of cost (cost) is helpful for internal managers to make cost-cost decisions and external investors and related institutions for enterprise performance prediction. As a manifestation of cost habit, the study of fee stickiness (cost stickiness) is rooted in the consideration of whether the decision made by managers based on traditional cost habit model is sufficiently accurate. The starting point of this paper is based on the influence of managers on the cost stickiness, how to motivate managers to carry out more active cost management and restrict their negative cost decisions. The manager's expense decision is related to the success or failure of the enterprise. However, the manager's motivation is the real driving force behind the cost decision, and there is an inevitable relationship between the manager's different motivation and the expense habit. The original intention of corporate governance design is to realize shareholders' supervision and balance to managers. Therefore, this paper studies the relationship between corporate governance, manager motivation and expense stickiness, and clarifies the influence path of different managers' motivation on expense behavior. It provides a more comprehensive theoretical guidance for the performance appraisal of managers through the expense ratio, and it also provides a more comprehensive theoretical guidance on how to strengthen corporate governance to restrict managers' self-interest motivation and thus alleviate the agency problem. How to strengthen the cost control to improve the value of the company has practical significance. On the basis of reviewing and reviewing the theoretical basis of this study and the domestic and foreign literatures on the characteristics of fee viscosity, causes, influencing factors and its economic consequences, Based on the theoretical analysis of the causes and influencing factors of the cost stickiness, this paper first studies the influence of three different motivations on the cost stickiness: the managers' optimal decision motive, the earnings management motivation and the self-interest motive. The optimal decision motivation of managers will lead to a higher level of cost stickiness; the cost symmetry of the sample company with earnings protection motivation is more obvious, while that of the company with new stock issuing motivation shows the characteristics of anti-stickiness. Managers' self-interest motivation has a positive effect on the level of expense stickiness. Specifically, M & A is the prerequisite for the implementation of managers' self-interest motivation. Sufficient free cash flow and long tenure of manager are the necessary conditions for managers' self-interest motivation, and the increase of variable proportion in manager's salary structure will stimulate the implementation of manager's self-interest motivation. These factors have a significant positive effect on the cost viscosity. Secondly, this paper examines the restriction effect of corporate governance on managers' self-interest motivation. The research shows that higher corporate governance intensity is beneficial to restrain managers' self-interest motivation, thus reducing the expense stickiness formed by managers' self-interest motivation. Improve the value of the company, and the low level of corporate governance companies, managers more obvious self-interest motivation, relatively high cost stickiness. Furthermore, the cost stickiness formed by the manager under the optimal decision motive will send a positive signal to the growth of the company's value, while the expense stickiness formed under the self-interest motive shows the low efficiency of the expense management. Will send a negative signal to the growth of the company's value. Finally, the conclusion of this paper is given, and some policy suggestions are given for Chinese enterprise managers to make scientific and reasonable cost management decisions.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F271;F275

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