發(fā)布時間：2018-02-24 07:16

  本文關(guān)鍵詞： 執(zhí)行難 信用制度 信用懲戒機制　出處：《廈門大學(xué)學(xué)報(哲學(xué)社會科學(xué)版)》2017年04期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：長期以來,學(xué)界及實務(wù)界一直將"執(zhí)行難"的成因歸結(jié)為"執(zhí)行體制未理順、地方保護主義嚴(yán)重、執(zhí)行不力"等,但歷經(jīng)多年的改革以及法院系統(tǒng)遍尋破解良方,"執(zhí)行難"不但沒有消解反有逐步強化的態(tài)勢。法院獨有的"執(zhí)行難"困局,究其實質(zhì)在于信用制度的缺失。建構(gòu)全國統(tǒng)一、協(xié)調(diào)共治的信用懲戒機制,是逐步克減法院"執(zhí)行難"的必由之路。同時,嘗試引入法律服務(wù)中介機構(gòu),協(xié)助法院分流訴訟與執(zhí)行壓力,亦不失為化解民事司法危機之可行的改革進路。
[Abstract]:For a long time, the academic and practical circles have attributed the causes of "difficult execution" to the fact that "the enforcement system is not straightened out, the local protectionism is serious, and the enforcement is weak". However, after many years of reform and the court system searching for a good solution, there is not only a situation of gradual strengthening, but also a situation of gradual strengthening of the "difficulty of execution". The essence of the difficulty lies in the lack of credit system and the construction of national unity. To coordinate the credit punishment mechanism of co-governance is the only way to gradually reduce the court's "enforcement difficulties". At the same time, it tries to introduce legal service intermediary to assist the court in diverting litigation and enforcement pressure. It is also a feasible reform way to resolve the crisis of civil justice.
【作者單位】： 廈門大學(xué)法學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家社科基金項目“法治中國視閾下的司法與政治關(guān)系研究”(14BFX002) 中央高�；�本科研業(yè)務(wù)費專項資金項目“法理學(xué)前沿問題研究”(20720171006)
【分類號】：D926.2
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本文編號：1529349